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ABSTRACT

With a significant reduction in defense spending into the foreseeable future, the size of the active component armed services is going to shrink and the composition of the force is going to change. Out of necessity, the reserve component is going to assume a larger role in national security.

The reserve component received mixed reviews for its performance during Desert Shield and Desert Storm and has an undistinguished history in the early stages of previous conflicts.

This paper looks at ways to improve operational readiness of the reserve component in order to be better prepared for the next war. The paper focuses on the Army reserve component because it is the largest reserve component, the most diverse and the most controversial.

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Total Force: Improving Reserve Component Readiness

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War brings a period of tremendous uncertainty that is unparalleled in American history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States remains as the world's lone military superpower. Yet, because of the uncertainty, the prescription for ensuring future national security remains clouded. The military threat is unclear and amidst growing cuts in the defense budget, the size and composition of the United States Armed Forces is under careful scrutiny.

In light of our current economic plight and the reordering of national priorities, the United States can no longer justify nor fiscally support a large standing armed force. In an election year, politicians from every persuasion are prepared to slash the defense budget and employ the "peace dividend" to their favorite projects. Consequently, in the future, more involvement in the conduct of major military operations such as Desert Storm and Just Cause will fall upon the reserve components, including the National Guard. This is in keeping with the "Total Force" concept put forth in the early 1970's.

Total Force has been the system of choice in shaping the Armed Forces of the United States since 1973, but it didn't receive a major test until mobilization of the reserve components for Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

The jury has reported back on the validity of the Total Force concept; yet the verdict is still unclear, amid mixed reports of the reserve components' performance. The picture painted by active

component field grade officers is often different than that of their seniors'-but then perhaps, so are their expectations.

What is clear, is that the proposed downsizing of the Armed Services and the attendant shift of increased responsibility to the reserve component, the Reserves will have to be ready to serve more often and be prepared to deploy more quickly than ever before. This equates to increased readiness.

Reserve component readiness has long been a controversial issue and Desert Storm only added to the debate. This paper focuses primarily on the Army's reserve component, because it is the largest, most diverse and the most controversial reserve element of the Total Force. Nonetheless, several of the issues and recommended solutions apply to the other Services as well. There are several critical items that need to be addressed. Among them are manpower, training, equipment and command relationship issues.

The paper will address some of those key issues, review the history of the reserve component, briefly look at the basic categories of the Reserve and then discuss the proposed Base Force. Finally, I will address some of the Army reserve component problems and provide recommendations to enhance their readiness.

BACKGROUND

The use of a reserve or militia force in the United States goes back to the Massachusetts Bay Colony, where it was not unusual to see troops drilling on the local commons. The Militia

Act, passed in 1792, "required all able bodied white male citizens between 18-45, to enroll in a general militia. Each man was required to provide his own musket, bayonet, belt and cartridges."¹ The most fabled employment of the reserve forces in American history is the role the Minutemen played at Lexington and Concord in the American Revolution.

19TH CENTURY

During the call to arms for the War of 1812, the states generally failed to respond, claiming that there was no provision in the Constitution giving the Federal government authority to direct mobilization of the local militia. Subsequent years saw a general deterioration of the militia. "When President Polk called for volunteers to fight in Mexico in the mid 1800s, the governors chose to hold musters and to seek volunteers. Those who volunteered were enrolled in companies, battalions and regiments. In many cases whole units volunteered and served with distinction."² The impact of the militia is difficult to measure during the Civil War, but the consensus seems to be that because of their small size and relative ineffectiveness, the Union and Confederate militia merely served to offset each other. During the Spanish American War, a Volunteer Army was formed instead of calling for a general mobilization of the National Guard, as it was now known. Despite the fact that the National Guard formed the nucleus of the Volunteer Army, most of the combat in the Spanish American War was done by the Regular Army.

TRANSITION FROM CONTINENTAL ARMY TO GLOBAL POWER

Following the Spanish American War, a shift in attitude gradually developed toward increasing the size of the armed services and establishing a viable Reserve. Military reformers argued that the United States needed a large standing force, a reserve and a conscription system in order to remain a world power. This attitude was fostered by the need to oversee and protect the large territorial acquisitions that resulted from the Spanish American War and recognition that the powers of Europe had been engaged in developing large cadres of military forces for over a century. Controversy ensued regarding the shape of this force. As pointed out by Robert Goldrich in The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force; "The basic framework was provided by three statutes over a seventeen-year period, the Dick Act 1903, the National Defense Act of 1916 and the National Defense Act of 1920. In broad terms, these three public laws for the Reserve forces provided the following:

- * A large, in terms of the total population of the United States, voluntarily recruited force. This force however, would still be smaller than those of the European continent.

- * Establishment of a federal Reserve force, primarily with support, specialist and technical missions, while ground combat Reserve forces remained almost wholly the responsibility of the National Guard.

- * Increased federal control of, involvement in and financial support for National Guard training, organization and equipment.

Increased Guard liability for federal service without lessening the state militia responsibility.

* Establishment of the Reserve Officer Training Corps."³

WORLD WAR I

World War I brought about the need for a rapid expansion of the Armed Forces, particularly the Army. Multiple officer and enlisted training camps were established to meet the surge. The ranks of the fledgling Officer Reserve Corps (ORC) and the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC), established by the National Defense Act of 1916, quickly expanded with the United States entry into World War I. Both the ORC and ERC fell under the direct control of the Army. This rapid expansion of the force and the short period of training left considerable doubt in the mind of General Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe, concerning the forces ability to fight. He devoted many additional months of training to the men who reached France in 1917 and early 1918.⁴

WORLD WAR II

"Mobilization of the National Guard and the call to active duty of the Organized Reserve Corps were authorized by Congress in August 1940. By November, half the National Guard had been called to federal duty and by March of 1941, all eighteen Guard divisions had been mobilized."⁵ This constituted sixty percent of the Army.

Two thirds of the Organized Reserve Corps were activated by the beginning of 1942.

The National Guard experienced an unusually high attrition in the early stages of mobilization. Between June 1940 and July 1941, forty percent of Guard end-strength had been discharged for a variety of reasons.⁶ After mobilization, many Guard units suffered from a lack of training and readiness. Many of their members had either been discharged or used as "fillers" for regular units. On an average, it took twenty-eight months for the National Guard units to reach a point of readiness where they could deploy overseas. Training problems alone were not the only hindering aspect. Availability of shipping, industrial mobilization and deployment strategy were all factors in arriving at combat readiness.⁷

World War II demonstrated an unparalleled buildup of U.S. forces and the mobilization of the American industrial capability. With the end of the war and a refocus of fiscal priorities toward the rebuilding of Europe, emphasis and priority quickly shifted away from the military.

The Reserve was relegated to a secondary role. The Gray Board of 1948 recommended what in effect would have been the federalization of the National Guard. The National Guard Association, desiring to keep as much state independence from the federal government as possible, quickly mustered their political might. Despite support from President Truman, the federalization issue was cast aside.

Priority of reserve component forces went to the National Guard and as a result, impractical mobilization plans were formed. The Organized Reserve only had one third of their authorized strength available, was under-funded, lacked adequate training facilities and had obsolete or inadequate equipment.

KOREA

The advent of the Korean War found the United States relatively unprepared for war. As the nation moved unexpectedly toward war, the result was inevitable, an Organized Reserve that was poorly trained, poorly equipped; a reserve that suffered from poor morale. Many of the reservists activated during the initial stages of the callup were World War II veterans in critical skills needed for casualty replacement. In many cases, they were woefully inadequate for the chore. This was because their skills had either deteriorated beyond useful employment or new equipment and technology were employed by the active force for which they had not been trained. Further, there was a strong resentment among these reservists that they were being unfairly called to serve again, when there were other citizens who had never served. Additionally, many of those recalled were given little forewarning and were forced to leave their families, business and personal affairs languishing.

Despite receiving the priority of funding and attention in the post World War II era, the National Guard was little better prepared to support MacArthur on the Korean peninsula than was the

Organized Reserve. As partial mobilization began and the nations' armed forces expanded, four National Guard divisions were activated. Unfortunately, they were plagued by many of the same deficiencies that affected the Organized Reserve, particularly in the areas of training, manpower, equipment availability and equipment readiness. "Because the Selective Service Act of 1948 permitted young men from civilian life to enlist directly into the National Guard without taking active duty training, the Guard divisions that were mobilized in 1950 reported with only 27 to 46 percent of their personnel MOS (military occupation specialty) qualified."⁶ Although exceptions can be made on a small scale, it can be accurately categorized that the Guard was generally unprepared to assume any significant role in the early stages of the War. "Two of the four Guard divisions initially activated were rated at only 40-45% ready after seven months of mobilization. They were shipped to Japan where they received another eight months of training before entering combat in December 1951."⁷

BERLIN CRISIS

The Berlin crisis, in some measure, is viewed as the first use of the total force concept as a political statement and a measure of deterrence. Unlike Korea, where the reserve components were not introduced until after hostilities broke out, the activation of reservists in 1961, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, can be loosely viewed as a factor in expressing national resolve. During the Berlin Crisis, just as during Korea, however, the true value of

the reserve component came under close scrutiny and sharp criticism.

In 1960, just a year prior to the Berlin mobilization, the Chief of the Army Reserve contended that "the Army Reserve is at the highest readiness level in history and prepared to assume their mission in integrating with active forces."¹⁰ When activated for Berlin however, units were critically understrength, lacking equipment and woefully trained. "Contingency plans called for the forces to be combat ready in 3-5 months. Several units required 8-10 months of training upon activation."¹¹ "A third of all mobilized Army Reservists were individuals used to fill out recalled units. Many of these units had fewer than half of their authorized troops and almost a third of those were totally unqualified in their positions."¹² Similar shortcomings that occurred during the Korean callup were uncorrected and resurfaced. "Since the shortcomings were mainly in technical skills, the need for experienced personnel was most urgent."¹³

During these mobilizations, a large emphasis was again placed on the Individual Ready Reservists possessing critical skills. This was to fill the void in the active forces and was the replacement method chosen over activating whole Reserve and National Guard units. The policy once again generated a great deal of criticism from the selected reservists, their Congressional supporters, as well as from the inactive individual ready reservists. The Individual Ready Reserve, once again, felt they were being treated unfairly by their recall to active duty, when

other citizens of the country were under no obligation to serve. The situation became even more tense when many reservists were called to active duty only to find themselves sitting at bases throughout the United States with no apparent meaningful function. The callup once again demonstrated the Army's lack of confidence in the Reserves' ability to perform at the required level. It created a political storm, as reservists responded to the call to duty separated from their families and businesses, only to find themselves underutilized.

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

During the Vietnam War, the Reserves and National Guard developed a reputation as a haven for draft dodgers and malcontents. In their book Chance and Circumstance, Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss point out that "a Pentagon study determined that over 70% of all reservists were draft motivated."¹⁴

A mutual suspicion between the active and reserve components became deeply rooted. Debate over the usefulness of reservists was rampant within the active forces. This is evidenced during the 1966 expansion of the military to meet Vietnam requirements, when JCS Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler expressed his desire "to have a reserve call-up in order to make sure the people of the United States knew that we are at war and not engaged at some two-penny military adventure."¹⁵ For his part, General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of the U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, stated inter alia, "although I wanted an expression of

national resolve...I well remember the Reserve Call-up by Kennedy during the Berlin crisis, when strong pressures arose before one year was up, to bring the boys home, a recollection that President Johnson later told me he shared."¹⁶ This statement clearly suggests Westmoreland's reluctance to activate the Reserve. President Johnson, after his decision to forego reelection, authorized the activation of 20,000 reservist in April 1968. Despite what appeared to be an opportune role for the reserve components, the real expansion of U.S. forces for the Vietnam War was conducted through the draft.

THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

The President's Commission on an All Volunteer Force was created by President Nixon in 1969 and headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates. In its final report published in February of 1970, the commission determined, "that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force."¹⁷ The commission further implied that an end to conscription was in order and targeted the end of fiscal year 1971 for the elimination of induction. These recommendations were approved by the President. In a memo to the service secretaries in 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said, "Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, and equipping Guard and Reserve

forces."¹⁸ However, with Presidential and Congressional approval, Secretary of Defense Laird moved the death of conscription out to July 1973, after over thirty years of uninterrupted use.

"The net effect of the end of the draft, however, was to increase the responsibilities of the reserve components, and hence the numerical strength requirements for the Reserves, while simultaneously and drastically decreasing their ability to fill their ranks."¹⁹ A major incentive for joining the reserve component faded with the shelving of the draft. The end of the draft also took with it the obligation of Americans to serve in the military. From this point forward, the nation would be required to develop a new motivation for youth to serve; and the all-volunteer force emerged.

Today, the fundamental framework of the Army remains much as it was when National Defense Act was established in 1920. There is a relatively large standing army, a Reserve that is responsive to the Army and a National Guard that responds to the state governors, yet is subject to federal scrutiny and control upon mobilization.

TOTAL FORCE

Total Force, in essence, proposes that the Armed Forces of the United States will be comprised of a suitable mix of both active and reserve component personnel. Further, the reserve forces will integrate with and complement the active forces.

From 1973 to the present, the integration of the Reserve into the overall scheme of national defense has been steadily increasing

to the point that the U.S. military can only respond to relatively small crisis without the Reserve serving as a partner in some measure. In a 1983 report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense stated, "If the Army had to deploy more than one division to a conflict, it would need many Army Reserve and Guard units to support those divisions unless it chose to accept the risk of drawing down its support forces in other theaters."²⁰ The Army continued to place increased reliance on Reserve and Guard Forces into the late 80's as they chose to increase the number of combat divisions from 16 to 18 (adding two active light infantry divisions). This was done without an increase in active duty strength. Instead, the Army chose to shift more of their combat support function into the Reserve and Guard and used reserve components to serve as "roundout" brigades, battalions and companies for active forces. The Army made a conscious decision to place more of their "teeth" in active forces and much of their "tail," up to two thirds, in the Reserve.

This partnership is no better illustrated than the Gulf War where combat support and combat service support reservists played a vital role in the in the defeat of Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi forces. By the same token, as a result of the lack of readiness of selected "round out" units and the time it took to get these units combat ready, this war also serves to point out several present and future deficiencies facing the total force as we move toward downsizing the force.

ORGANIZATION OF THE RESERVE

In addition to the Army Reserve, the Army has an additional component in the National Guard. In peacetime, the Guard falls under the control of its respective state governor, unless marshalled under federal control through special authority vested in the President and the Congress.

Interestingly, the role of the National Guard has continued to follow along historical lines, that is, primarily organized for combat operations (infantry, armor, artillery). There are some combat support units in the Guard, but one might think that the governors could make better use of engineer and transportation units instead of tank and infantry units. This focus toward combat units is based in the pre-Revolutionary War period when the Guard or militia was established in each state as combat organizations to protect the citizenry of the states from their enemies. In later years, this role expanded to include support of the governors in such as areas as public safety, disaster relief, crowd control or any other extraordinary requirement levied upon the state government. The Reserves, on the other hand, are predominantly a combat support and combat service support force.

The Reserve forces are broken down into three major categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower for the reserves and is comprised of the Selected Reserve (normally thought of as drilling reservists or guardsmen); those individuals in a

paid status, the Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard. "The Selected Reserve, with just over 45% of all Army reservists, consists mainly of soldiers in organized units of the Army National Guard or Army Reserve who train periodically and are paid."²¹ A typical Guardsman or reservist in the selected reserve, trains twelve weekends a year and spends an additional two weeks a year on active duty for training.

Individual Ready Reservists are typically servicemen who have completed their period of active duty, have been placed in a status where they are usually no longer required to drill and are merely fulfilling their term of obligated duty. Inactive National Guardsmen are Guard members no longer required to drill.

The Standby Reserve is not a major force. It is typically comprised of key civil service personnel and some politicians. These members are not required to drill and are only activated in a national emergency.

The Retired Reserve is composed of all reserve component personnel who have otherwise met all the requirements for reserve retirement, but have not yet reached the age of 60.²²

THE BASE FORCE

The dissolution of the former Soviet Union is causing everyone involved with the Total Force to reevaluate the size and composition of the force. In light of the sudden speed of the events that are changing the present world and shaping the future, there is no definitive threat assessment against which to develop

the future force.

The general consensus indicates there are no immediate emerging military superpowers that can directly challenge the supremacy of the United States. The world for the near future will likely remain volatile, however. Our future global military commitments are most likely regional conflicts, such as the Persian Gulf War. There are a number of regions and potential conflicts around the globe that bear watching, such as the India-Pakistan dispute, the Korean Peninsula, the Philippines, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, but few that warrant our direct military intervention. A more likely course of action is to initially increase the use of the United Nations and her "peacekeeping" charter to intervene and settle these regional conflicts.

The American military will retain a strategic capability, both in terms of weapons and conventional reach. It will be a peacetime force, some of it forward deployed for alliance stability and much of it CONUS-based for centrally deployable flexibility and responsiveness. Further, it will be a force capable of enforcing treaties, combating terrorism, interdicting drug smugglers and performing more non-traditional roles such as disaster relief.

The challenge facing the national leadership is determining whether the prescribed force mix (active vs. reserve) is in fact adequate. The issues are multiple. What is the threat? At what time and rate must military power be built up? Is there enough combat power in the active component? Is there enough combat support? Can the reserves be mobilized in time to get to the

fight? Are they adequately trained, manned and equipped? Is there sufficient lift for either force to get to a crisis spot in time to make a difference? What are the political ramifications for Congress "back home?"

Secretary of Defense Cheney and JCS Chairman, General Powell have proposed "The Base Force Concept" to Congress. It recognizes the fiscal constraints that will undoubtedly befall the military. The President's Budget for FY93 proposes a Defense budget by 1997 that represents approximately 3.6% of the Gross National Product (GNP). This is the smallest percentage of GNP since pre World War II. It represents the Joint Chiefs' "bottom line" military force estimate that will allow the United States to remain a military superpower, meet our global commitments and support national defense policy. It was developed to bring together the optimum balance of active and reserve forces to preserve our national interests.

A key to the "Base Force" is the heavy reliance on reserve components to support our overseas commitments in Europe, the Middle East and Southwest Asia as one of the main components of the newly conceived Atlantic Force. The Pacific Force emphasizes a forward presence and a primary focus on active forces, with reinforcement from the continental United States (CONUS). The Contingency Force²³ is heavily reliant on the active component, using a combination of forward positioned forces such as carrier battle groups and CONUS based forces that are rapidly deployable such as the XVIII Airborne Corps, Marine Expeditionary Forces

(MEF), and Air Force units. Nevertheless, the Contingency Forces are going to require Reserve support, even in the early stages. This will likely come in the form of airlift and combat support forces.

The key to the Base Force is the organization or structure of the forces. The "Base Force" calls for a reduction in the number of active divisions in the Army from 18 to 12 and a reduction of the number of reserve component divisions from 10 to 6, with an additional 2 divisions in a cadre status.

In terms of sheer numbers, this represents a cut of active Army forces from 769.7 thousand to 535.5 thousand and a reduction in the reserve Army component from 776.2 thousand to 550.8 thousand.²⁴ However, active-reserve reductions have been proportional; the Army total force ratio moves slightly from 49.8% : 50.2% (active to reserve component) in FY90 to 49.3% : 50.9% in FY97. The intent is to delete all unneeded structure in the active and reserve component over the next five years. As stated earlier, since cuts in active and reserve combat units are being made, corresponding cuts in the active and reserve combat support components are appropriate.

However, in an article in the January 1992 ROA National Security Report entitled, "Pentagon's Plans for Reserve Cuts Across the Board Won't Work," Arnold Punaro, the Majority Staff Director for the Senate Armed Services Committee, argues that "the Defense Department has made some short-sighted decisions that are not in our best national security interests and Congress has

rejected them.¹⁵" He includes the proportionate cut of the Reserves to the active forces in the category of short sighted decisions and further suggests that only Congress has the ability to make the long term defense decisions that are vital to the national interest. He further contends that "DoD has not made a sound case, as the threat and as warning time have diminished, that relying less on the National Guard and reserve component makes any sense from a military standpoint or from a budget standpoint."¹⁶ Consequently, he points out that the Senate recommended increased emphasis on the Reserve for the future force.

Over two years ago, the Congress directed the Executive Branch to undertake a Total Force policy study to form the basis of future decisions throughout government in regards to the makeup of the Total Force. As established in Congressional testimony, the DoD study group initially recommended placing increased reliance on the reserve components in developing strategy and structure for the future force. However, this recommendation was not borne out in the final report which stated that a "share the pain" approach should be adapted between the active and reserve components in shaping the future force, i.e., a proportional cut in the final report.

The fact that the final report recommendation for a "share the pain" approach differed markedly from the draft report was not lost on Congress. The final report met with harsh criticism from the various lawmakers on the Hill.

On the other extreme, there are those in DoD that prefer a

force that is overwhelmingly reliant on the active component for the initial stages of any conflict. The feeling is, Desert Storm notwithstanding, that the Reserve can't possibly maintain the training levels and expertise needed to respond to short notice contingencies. They point to the fact that reserve components had up to six months to get ready for Desert Storm. Their feeling is that the reserve components should be used for filling critical shortages in the active component and as follow-on forces during a major mobilization.

Despite the rhetoric and politics, the fact of the matter is that in this century, the reserve component just hasn't been ready when called. The one notable exception is Desert Shield, particularly in those functions and services where individual rather than unit skills were central. There is considerable argument about the readiness of the roundout brigades and other units. Many units received no real test.

This is not a debate that can focus on any one component or agency. The entire government process shares in any deficiency that may exist in the reserve component. The reserve component has often been the scapegoat of decisions made within the DoD and Congress.

Most of the problems that confront the Total Force of the future are in some manner related to one of the following: improper structure, inadequate equipment, inadequate training, unreasonable expectation of reserve capabilities, poor leadership, acute personnel shortages, and improper employment.

In the past, we have typically protected our national interests either through relative isolationism or by meeting international threats overseas, well beyond our borders. There are notable exceptions of course, such as the War of 1812 and small wars in the Caribbean, but for the most part, this strategy has been upheld through the years and served us well. The key is that the United States, primarily through her geographic placement, has been able to avoid many of the wars and disputes that have afflicted Europe and Asia. We do not have a requirement to mobilize the citizenry at a moment's notice to defend the country within the confines of our borders in the manner of Israel and South Korea.

There is a requirement however, to rapidly mobilize the reserve component to meet major regional challenges and intervene in matters of national interest, such as Desert Storm. The next mobilization may not allow a six-and-one-half month buildup. Consequently, the DoD and the Army must be prepared for a more rapid and intense mobilization of the reserve component.

A fundamental, implied tenant of the Base Force is the requirement to be able to stage a more rapid mobilization than was seen in the Gulf War (assuming there is a requirement to mobilize for a regional conflict of the same magnitude as Desert Shield/Desert Storm). This situation is created by the reduction in the number of active component units that will be available to support future conflicts. Thus if a large force buildup is required, reserve component forces will have to rapidly fill the

void. As an example, VII Corps, which spearheaded the Army attack into Iraq has been deactivated. Consequently, many of the missions that would have otherwise gone to VII Corps, will of necessity go to the Reserves.

In attempting to identify methods of improving Reserve readiness, the armed forces of several countries were studied, including: Switzerland, South Korea, Israel and France. These countries employ a form of the total force concept. The following points are worthy of consideration:

- * There is no reluctance on the part of any of these countries to integrate or mix reserve and active duty components of their respective armed services.

- * Reserves provide the main wartime quantitative strength of the armed forces. The active forces provide the quality.

- * The standards and quality against which the force is judged are determined by the regular or active component.

- * Each country typically expects its tier I (Selected Reserve) forces to spend at least three weeks a year on active duty and they often spend more.

- * Officers and NCOs are expected to maintain a high level of proficiency and typically spend more time (beyond the three weeks that the basic soldier spends) on active duty.

- * Both civilian and professional military education are a major consideration in promotion and assignment to positions of increased leadership.

* The reserve components make maximum use of armed forced members recently released from active duty.

* Reserves are included in "real world" operations.

* Youth is emphasized.

* One significant difference in the national cultures of the nations examined is the philosophy of universal service or conscription which is the underpinning of the armed forces of these countries (although it is on the wane in France). Universal service is not only absent in the United States, but further, its revival does not enjoy widespread support at this time nor is it likely to in the near future. The lack of this readily available, trained pool of personnel makes the reserve component of the United States Total Force that much more crucial.

The remainder of this paper deals with Total Force issues that directly impact the Army's reserve component and explore solutions to problems. The issues are broken into three categories: Definition of the Requirements, Individual/Unit Skills, and Relationships with the Active Component.

DEFINITION OF THE REQUIREMENTS:

REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS: The issue of reasonable expectations for reserve components is important. They should not be assigned roles they cannot reasonably execute. One of the lessons that emerged from Desert Shield and Desert Storm was that individuals or small units, capitalizing on related civilian skills, were quickly prepared for deployment as opposed to larger, more complex units

that took significantly longer.

Reservists in airlift and tactical fighter squadrons, medical, military police, civic action, transportation and engineer support units were typically ready to meet rapid deployment windows and required only limited post mobilization workups.

A major criticism of the Army's "round out" philosophy was borne by fact that the "48th National Guard Infantry Brigade (Georgia National Guard) and the "round out" brigade for the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division was not ready in the required time frame." "The 48th Brigade reported to the Division that they would be combat ready in forty eight to fifty days. The officers in the 48th Brigade were both overly optimistic and overly ambitious. It took ninety-one days to reach combat readiness."²⁰

It is not practical to expect a reserve component infantry or mechanized brigade to be combat ready in fifty days and it is not practical to place these round out brigades in a position where they may have to deploy as part of a rapidly deployable force.

Reserves typically have 40 unit training days a year, while active forces get approximately 250 training days a year.²¹ The training time between the two doesn't begin to equate and it is unreasonable to assume that there is any magical efficiency or leadership method to make up the difference in training time. On the contrary, reserve component personnel are going to require additional time to hone the skills that their active component counterpart have been developing through the years. The challenge that must be faced is ensuring units assigned to rapid deployment

or contingency forces can reasonably respond with an appropriate state of operational competence.

The fact that the Guard "roundout" units were not ready is not as much a reflection on them, than it is a reflection on a system that has deluded itself with unreasonable expectations of Reserve readiness. The "roundout" units are regarded by many as some of the better units in the Guard and are manned by dedicated and eager volunteers who responded to the call. Readiness expectations were simply too high. The point that must be recognized, is that the training, coordination and synchronization required to bring a large combat organization together greatly exceeds that which one can reasonably expect to achieve in twelve weekends of drills and one two week period of active duty training per year. There is a need to establish a baseline performance for the reserve component that is based on the same competency indicators applied to the active components.

How do we deal with the readiness dilemma from a Total Force perspective? It is necessary to recognize that the active component, augmented by critical skills and unique units from the reserve component (e.g. airlift and military police personnel), will bear the responsibility for the initial stages of any future deployment. Where appropriate, reserve component units or members will be employed. "Roundout" combat units have no place in the early stages of a contingency.

Force lists must be tailored to realistically reflect the post mobilization training that one can expect a Reserve unit to require

prior to combat. As an example, if it is determined that a notional infantry brigade needs ninety days of post mobilization training, then it should not be scheduled in the Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to arrive in the area of operations at M+45. It should be scheduled to deploy at some point beyond M+90. It makes no sense to assign a unit to the TPFDD or force list when we know the unit can't be ready. Required readiness levels are going to vary from unit to unit and between operation plans. It is impractical to expect (and no one rationally does) every Reserve unit or for that matter, every active unit, to be combat ready on M-Day. The fact of the matter is that most reserve units are going to require post mobilization training. This is not a problem in itself, since the required lift will not be available at M-day, but it does require prioritizing training and timely mobilization.

Another factor is the available transportation in balance with the distance to be moved and the size of the force to be deployed. Reserve component readiness can be tied to actual force deployment and buildup projections. As an example, if lift to a specific theater is expected to be available for reserve component follow-on units at M+75, then their training priorities and milestones should be developed accordingly.

A TRUE MEASUREMENT OF MOBILIZATION: Predeployment performance objectives and training milestones need to be objectively established for each major type of Reserve unit. These measurements should provide an accurate index as to how long it takes to get a reserve component combat ready. This would be

useful in providing meaningful force lists for the CINC and the Services. The required information can be captured from the Desert Shield post mobilization training and used in determining the future mobilization and deployment schedule for Reserve units.

PRIORITY TO UNITS FIRST TO GO: Since funding is going to be scarce, a priority for training and readiness needs to be developed for the reserve component. Priority should be given to those units and personnel that are required to be mobilized and deployed within 90 days of M-Day. These units would constitute tier I units. Units on tier II typically reflect those units that are expected to deploy between M+90 and M+150. These are combat and combat service support units and selected "round out" units necessary to reinforce or augment the active component and tier I units. Finally, tier III units and personnel would constitute forces required in a general mobilization and whose mobilization may stretch out from M+150 and beyond. These are typically combat and combat service support units from brigade through division/corps. Additional time is afforded these units to complete unit integration training and advanced skills training. This philosophy implies the initial combat forces are coming from the active component and most of the reserve combat units will be provided time to train to combat readiness after mobilization.

USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR): We have traditionally had to dip into the Individual Ready Reserve upon mobilization and for critical skills and individual fillers. Unfortunately, as we have seen in previous mobilizations,

particularly Korea, this has caused widespread morale problems. In some cases, the active component by-passed the selected reserve members or units to dip in the IRR for skilled personnel in other than critical areas. This is understandably regarded as an affront by the reserve component, but it is likely an event that we will see again, in the future.

Because IRR personnel have usually accumulated at least four years of active duty in the more technical military occupation specialties (MOSSs), they are assumed to be either relatively proficient in their MOS or retrainable with minimal refresher training.

Unfortunately this is not necessarily the case. As mentioned earlier, unless the skills are continually used, they deteriorate. Although IRR personnel may work in a related civilian skill, it doesn't always follow that the skill can be transferred into a military benefit.

To counter this problem and to take advantage of the resources available in the IRR, bonuses should be extended to IRR members with critical skills to entice them to come back on active duty annually for refresher or new equipment training. This program is being done to a limited degree now, but the programs need expansion. The lack of critical skills in the reserve component (or the active component for that matter) may be a "showstopper" in the next war. To take this a step further, more bonuses should be offered to active component members with critical skills or valuable experience to entice them to join the Selected Reserve

upon completion of active service.

The reserve component is presently faced with a pleasant choice. With the downsizing of the active component, there will be skilled personnel leaving the Services. This presents an opportunity to cull out marginal performers from the reserve components and replace them with experienced departing active component members, thus strengthening the Reserve.

MEDICAL READINESS: One of the more significant shortcomings of the reserve components during the Persian Gulf callup was the large number of personnel unable to immediately deploy due to substantial medical and dental problems. By some counts, the physically disqualified were as high as fifteen to twenty percent in selected units. This is an area that must be resolved. One possibility is to expand the medical and dental care offered by Reserve medical and dental units. This will only reach a small number of the reservists, however. Another option is to extend a dental plan similar to the one provided to active duty dependents to the reserve component. Regardless, there will be a requirement to mobilize medical personnel early at the stations of initial assignment to deal with the health related issues.

DEVELOPING INDIVIDUAL /UNIT SKILLS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT

TRAINING STANDARDS: The entire entire method of training evaluation for the reserve component should be reviewed. The ARTEP standards are fine, but the same grading criteria applied to active

component units should be applied to the reserve component with active component personnel serving as evaluators. One must recognize that reserve component units are not likely to achieve the same level of readiness as their active component counterparts, but at least a single standard provides a clearer measure of readiness. One method of evaluation is to assign the process to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. The Center would be responsible for evaluating all Army component units, active and reserve. Special training evaluations such as jungle warfare could be assigned to the respective schools. State standards for the Guard should be scrapped except as they pertain to state requirements. Any other measure is like comparing apples to oranges when determining unit readiness. Reserve units that continually fail to measure up to the standards should be deactivated.

TRAINING FOCUS: We must ensure the fundamentals are the focus of training prior to mobilization. The modern battlefield is extremely complex, fluid and filled with uncertainty. The intuitive execution of the fundamentals of the profession of arms are essential for victory in battle. These instincts are not innate and must be nurtured. They require a complete understanding and mastery of basic skills. For the most part, these skills can't be developed to the degree required with the amount of training time presently allocated. This is due to competing training priorities; a brigade commander wants to exercise his brigade, just as a battalion commander wants to exercise his

battalion. Unfortunately, the training time devoted to these exercises and the workups to them, leave inadequate training time at the individual and small unit level.

Some units rely on individual and team skills for their operational performance, while others require integration of several diverse units and/or functions at multiple layers in the command. The latter units are more difficult and time consuming to develop because of their complexity and the time needed to create the necessary synchronization among all elements.

Many of the individual and team skills can be developed in schools, whereas the only way to develop the more complex units is through an incremental, "building block" approach in training. Operational competence requires different approaches for different types of units.

Trying to integrate all the unit level soldierly skills at the battalion level prior to mobilization is an unreasonable task. Skills such as fire support coordination and synchronization require an undivided and continual focus that just can't be provided within the present training constraints. It is difficult at best at the company level. Consequently, Reserve training should be focused at the squad/platoon level and moved to the company level only after platoon skills have been successfully mastered. Integration at the battalion level should be left to post mobilization training, followed by brigade training. The combat arms and technical units are going to be the most difficult to train and integrate because of the multiple and complex tasks

they need to hone.³⁶

Training should be concurrent and parallel. This will reduce the required post mobilization training. While the platoons and companies are developing fundamental tactical skills, the battalion and brigade headquarters learn to coordinate combined arms, develop sound command and staff skills and wargame deployment and type operations (e.g., river crossing, barrier operations, line haul transport operations, etc.) which they may be expected to perform in combat. This should be done at the headquarters level in exercises without troops before exercising the unit as a whole.

Every effort should be made to integrate the platoon and company size units into active component regular exercises and operations. This helps to develop rapport and provides the reservist a clear picture of what is expected from his unit. This training should be the focus of annual training duty. The battalion and brigade headquarters should be integrated in active component command post exercises as well, in order to promote cohesion and better understanding among the components.

MORE ANNUAL TRAINING DUTY: The typical forty-eight drill (typically two drills per days that usually translates into twelve weekends per year) and two weeks annual training has been a part of the reserve component *modus operandi* for decades. In many cases, it doesn't provide the time to adequately prepare the reserve component to meet their potential commitments. An alternative approach is to increase the annual training duty period from two to three weeks and reduce the number of drills from forty eight to

forty. The increased active duty time allows the reserve component a longer period to focus on mission oriented training, provides increased opportunity for integrated training with the active component and affords increased opportunities to participate in exercises and operations.

TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR RESERVIST: Another related item that must be dealt with is the training of reserve component members in technical skills. The fact of the matter is that you can't train and remain proficient in many technical skills (e.g., telecommunications technicians, radar repairman, sonar operators, etc.) under the current one-weekend-a-month drill policy. The skills are complex and require frequent use or they atrophy. It is difficult to develop and train an up-to-date, technically competent servicemember in the active component; to think we can do it in the reserve component is not realistic. There are exceptions to the rule (aviators and interrogators-translators for example, have demonstrated that they have been able to retain the skills), but they are few.

The full time support (FTS) and the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program, take a reserve component member and places the member in a full time civilian support or active duty status in a Reserve or Guard unit. This provides only limited relief for this dilemma. These efforts do not begin to fill the void. There needs to be a major expansion of these reserve component support programs.

Another alternative is for the active components to recruit and overstaff those critical military occupation specialties (MOS)

that cannot be effectively manned and trained in the reserve components. These overstaffed personnel can serve in unrestricted billets such as recruiters, drill instructors or general military instructors when not serving in their MOS. This obviously is not the most efficient use of these skills, but it does ensure that the critical skills, that take a long time to develop are available upon mobilization.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION: We need to take a hard look at the professional military education program provided to the reserve component. More funding and educational opportunities need to be directed to the reserve component for advanced military education. Reserve component officers should be provided similar professional education opportunities beyond the standard correspondence courses, to those afforded by their active duty counterparts. Completion of appropriate professional military educational training should be included as a prerequisite to command, leadership billets (both officer and enlisted) and promotion.

RESERVE DEMOGRAPHICS: An item that bears investigation is the review of reserve unit geographic locations throughout the country. This review should compare the types of Reserve units located in each area to determine if the demographics support the recruiting requirements. Reserve components should be organized to take advantage of the shifting demographics we have seen over the last twenty-five years. The shift toward the "sunbelt" and west, coupled with the migration from northern cities, suggests that

Reserve units may not be geographically aligned to take advantage of the skills of the local workforce.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE ACTIVE FORCE:

AUTOMATED SUPPORT SYSTEMS: Greater emphasis needs to be placed on a complete integration of the active and reserve component support systems such as finance, supply, maintenance and personnel administration. There has been some movement in this direction but the transformation is too slow, inadequate and it is often designed to establish a separate and unique system tailored to the reserve component. With today's automation and computer systems, there are no reasons for the active and reserve components to have separate automated support systems. Separate systems are wasteful, redundant and usually unresponsive to mobilization requirements.

EQUIPMENT: One of the problems that has hindered reserve readiness and had a negative impact on the entire total force is the issue of inadequately equipping the Reserves. Until recently, it has been the active force policy to selectively pass down outdated equipment into the reserve component as new equipment was fielded. This in effect meant that some of the equipment used by the reserve was either old or obsolete and created interoperability problems with the active forces. Consequently, the training and skills developed by the respective members were often not transferrable between the active and the reserve component.

Over the past 4 years, Congress has appropriated \$1.6 billion specifically for upgrading reserve component equipment. This has had a marked impact upon reserve component readiness. However, providing new equipment to the reserve component is a double edged sword. The problem in providing some of the new complex equipment to the reserve component is the sophistication involved in operating and maintaining the equipment and the limited training time to learn new systems. It is not possible to become proficient on many of the high tech items with the limited training time available. This is one of the shortfalls of the total force that cannot be addressed by moving more functions into the reserve component.

Systems that are training and maintenance intensive do not fit well in the reserve. For those systems that can be adequately absorbed into the reserve component and which are presently unavailable, there is a potential equipment windfall from the active components that are being deactivated. Every effort should be directed at refitting the reserve component with the same equipment used by the active component, provided they can operate and maintain it. This will improve interoperability.

ASSIGNMENT OF ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL TO RESERVE UNITS: The assignment of active duty personnel to Reserve and Guard units is a controversial issue in many quarters. The reservists see it as an infringement or usurpation of their authority, while active servicemembers often view duty with the reserve component as career threatening. The addition of active component personnel brings a

much broader base of experience, training and leadership than the reservist would otherwise be exposed to. The Marine Corps has successfully used a system similar to this for years. The active component member, called an inspector and instructor, acts as a full time adviser to the reserve component and performs many of the administrative, training coordination and maintenance functions that the reservists are unable to achieve during the drill periods. The inspector-instructors are located down to the company and detachment level.

Taken a step further, this system can be refined by using the active component members as the cadre for the Reserve unit, to the point that they are the shell of the unit. In some cases, key billets within a unit, including the commander, may be filled by active component personnel and rounded out with reservists. In other units, the key billets may be filled by Reserve personnel augmented by the active component. The idea is to gain the maximum spinoff from the training and experience of the active component and start the active component/reserve component integration process early.

In order for this system to work, it will have to be career enhancing for the active component member. Command and senior leadership opportunities will also have to be provided for the reserve components in order to provide them career advancement opportunities.

There are other options in using active component personnel to train reservists, among them Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and active

component affiliation to reserve component units.

MTTs are particularly effective in providing specialized training or training in areas where the reserve component may not have the required expertise. Personnel to man the MTTs can come from various sources ranging from affiliated active component units to active component functional schools. The training can range from maintenance training to professional military education.

Active component affiliation on the other hand, would assign responsibility for Reserve unit training to a like active component unit and could go to the extreme of providing a cadre structure for the reserve unit.

Irregardless of the method used to provide training to the reserve component, the instructors must be competent and well versed in instructional methods.

FEDERALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD: One item that has been raised in the past and quickly defeated is the idea of federalizing the National Guard. Like so many of the issues surrounding the reserve, this is an emotionally charged topic. In many respects federalization makes a lot of sense at the national level, although it is vigorously opposed at the state level.

Thirty percent of total Army and forty-three percent of the Army's combat power reside in the various National Guard units throughout the country. Yet the Guard, for the most part, is under responsive to the Regular Army. Its first allegiance is to the governors, despite receiving the preponderance of its funds from the federal government. The governors however, have no legislative

authority in national security matters. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Guard to serve two masters. Consequently, overall readiness of the Army suffers. Instances have been cited by Regular Army commanders that demonstrate they had only the most limited affiliation with their National Guard "roundout" units until after mobilization for the Gulf War. They further indicate that the Guard units were training to different standards and missions than their active counterparts. This caused the Guard units to go back to square one in the training cycle when they were mobilized. Certainly, some of the problems can be overcome through closer coordination, but it does point out the difficulties in serving two masters.

From a states' perspective, the primary focus of the Guard is on matters of public safety. Public safety can be provided by a service force much smaller than that maintained through the Guard.

Federalizing the Guard would greatly improve Army readiness by providing an uninterrupted link between the reserve component and its active component sponsor. It ensures a common set of standards are adopted and it will improve readiness through a more streamlined chain of command.

The Gray Board in 1948 recommended the federalization of the National Guard as did Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1964. Strong opposition from the National Guard Association forced the demise of the Gray Board report and forced McNamara to change his support for federalization. Instead he opted to try to roll the Reserve into the Guard. The National Guard Association was only

too happy to support this position for it increased their power base and that of the governors. Rather than roll the Organized Reserve into the Guard, the issue died unresolved as it fell into the "too tough" category.

POLITICS OF THE FORCE MIX: When examining Total Force, one cannot ignore the politics of the issue. As Binkin and Kaufmann point out in U. S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, and Risks,:

"It would be comforting to assume that the current mix of active and reserve Army forces and missions was the product of a sound planning process within which decisions were based on cost and effectiveness considerations. In fact, however, the current Army structure has evolved in bits and pieces and apparently without any grand strategic design."

The force is shaped more today by domestic policies rather than by sound military planning and programming. The fact of the matter is that any reduction in the size of the Reserves is a political issue. Politicians are grasping to hold on to any semblance of economic viability for their constituents and they are aggressively pursuing policies that will protect the reserve and Guard units within their districts, even when it smacks of "pork barrel" politics.

The politics of the Reserve is a difficult concept for many active component members to understand. It is an emotionally charged issue and the Congressional staffers recommending the active and reserve component authorizations and appropriations

(read force mix) are often themselves politicians and/or members of the reserve component. In many areas of the country, the National Guard armory is a focal point for social and political activity. Politicians are not likely to take action that will close an armory. The National Guard Association and Reserve Officer Association are political forces that must be dealt with throughout the country. Many political campaigns receive considerable support from the reserve component.

One of the chief arguments for transferring many of the regular military functions and missions into the reserve component is the cost benefit. Estimates place the reserve component cost saving over active components in peacetime, anywhere from thirty to seventy percent (depending on who is doing the figuring and for what reason). While this may be true from a strict peacetime cost basis, the cost of Reserve unit readiness and response time are deferred until the point of war, when money is no longer an issue, but time is. Cost is not the sole basis for measuring the appropriate mix for the total force, but it gets a lot of play on Capitol Hill and from the reserve supporters.

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The issues selected for this paper were chosen because of their impact on reserve component operational readiness and have reasonable solutions. The federalization of the Guard and the extension of annual active duty training for the Reserves from two to three weeks are the likely exceptions; not because they aren't

reasonable, but rather, they are too politically sensitive.

The primary focus for shaping reserve operational readiness must be in the following areas:

- a. assigning more active component personnel to the reserve component units, including command.
- b. improving small unit (platoon and below) training.
- c. extension of active duty training for Reserves.
- d. increased integrated training with active component.
- e. increased use of IRR members in critical skills.

I would include the federalization of the National Guard in this focus as well, if I thought it had even the remotest opportunity for legislative passage.

More active component billets, including command assignments, in the reserve component have several advantages. I prefer to see these billets form the cadre of the units. The active component members bring with them familiarity of active standards, modern training techniques, a sound understanding of doctrine, experience, and a full time focus to the unit. They can only serve to enhance readiness of the reserve component.

The other priority issues are directed at training and they are relatively low cost, high gain options. Small unit training is the foundation upon which the force must be built. It should be apparent that when a reservist has the equivalent of only forty training days a year, proficiency is difficult to achieve. Training has got to receive increased emphasis if the Reserve is going to be ready the next time it is called.

Although I didn't place the other issues for discussion in the priority category, they remain major concerns and typically provide a high return in readiness for the time and money invested. Most of them, such as improved technical training are logical outgrowths of the priority issues.

The Total Force is more prepared today than at any other time in our nation's history. The principal reason for this is the volunteer nature of the force and the recent experience gained in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Five years from now, much of that edge will likely be lost through attrition and shifting national priorities. Now is the time to honestly assess and design the force needed for the future. The trappings of a hollow force are in place: isolationist rhetoric, budget cuts, partisan reserve/active force politics, cuts in the industrial base, declining educational standards and the natural tendency for the nation to let down its guard in light of the "new world order."

Readiness requires quality personnel, time, training and sacrifice. If the Total Force as we understand it is going to continue to succeed, it will require further sacrifice from the reserve component members. They must be required to maintain a high level of readiness.

ENDNOTES

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20. Binkin and Kaufmann, U. S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, p. 36.

21. Binkin and Kaufmann, U. S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, p.6

22. Reservists typically meet the requirements for reserve retirement prior to the age of 60. However, they do not receive retired pay until their 60th birthday.

23. The Atlantic Force, the Pacific Force and the Contingency Force addressed in the "Base Force" do not reflect the current forces in the Unified Command Plan.

24. Chairman, JCS Brief to the Senate Budget Committee of 29 January 1992.

25. Punaro, Arnold, "Pentagon's Plans for Reserve Cuts Across the Board Won't Work," ROA National Security Report, January 1992. p. 26.

26. *ibid.* p.26.

27. The actual degree of readiness is a matter of considerable debate.

28. Dunnigan, James f. and Bay, Austin, From Shield to Storm, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1991. p. 304.

29. The number of available training days a year is a deceptive figure. Training is continually interrupted for administrative events that have varying relations to training such as inspections, inspection preparation, parades, demonstrations, etc. Both the active and reserve components have these extra requirements. Reserve component members may actually get more than 40 days of training when one factors in the schools they attend such as NCO school, MOS schools and other educational opportunities.

30. In effect I am espousing that a fully integrated reserve combat brigade may not be ready for combat until M+120 or beyond.

31. Binkin and Kaufmann, U. S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, p. 21